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Actors’ and Analysts’ Categories 
 
Let it be accepted that sociological explanation must begin with the perspective of 
the actor. The causes that give rise to anything that can be seen as consistent actions 
among actors turn on regularities as perceived by the actors first and the analyst second. 
If the analyst brings the idea of a mortgage to the study of the life of a tribe living in the 
Amazon jungle, then nothing consistent will emerge, for the tribe does not organize its 
existence around the idea of mortgage. Likewise, if the analyst brings the idea of the 
poison oracle as used by the Azande tribe to the study of life in Western Europe, nothing 
consistent will emerge, for western Europeans do not organize their lives around the 
divination of witches by administering poison to chickens. Insofar as analysts are going 
to develop categories of their own—analysts’ categories—to do the work of explanation, 
those categories will have to be built upon actors’ categories. 
But where do actors’ categories end and the analysts’ categories start? In other 
words, given the idea of the double hermeneutic, there is still a choice to be made about 
the role of the two components. I want to start by thinking about how we make the choice 
in science studies, particularly in the analysis of scientific controversies. 
 
Actors and Analysts in the Study of Science 
From the very beginning, science studies have been beset with the problem of 
how much science you need to know to be able to analyze science. “Science warriors,” 
such as Alan Sokal, insist that to understand the causes that lead scientists to switch from 
one belief to another one must have a complete grasp of the science itself. As Giles 
(2006) reports in reference to this author: 
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Sokal says he is struck by Collins’s skills in physics, but notes that such 
understanding would not be enough for more ambitious sociology research that 
attempts to probe how cultural and scientific factors shape science. “If that’s 
your goal you need a knowledge of the field that is virtually, if not fully, at the 
level of researchers in the field,” says Sokal. “Unless you understand the science 
you can’t get into the theories. (p. 8)  
Some historians of science work this way, and in the early days there was tension, largely 
dissipated now, between this kind of historian and those sociologists who were less 
technically proficient (on the broad relations between analysts and science itself and how 
these lead to different outcomes, see Collins, 2004a, pp. 783-799. For myself, after 
discovering that my kind of work could in fact be done without a technical understanding 
of the science sufficient to be able to contribute to the field—and it may well not have 
turned out that way—the conceptual tension has been finally resolved with the idea of 
“interactional expertise.” Interactional expertise is a deep understanding of the language 
of the science being studied, and it is gained through immersion in the discursive world 
of the actors without immersion in their physical world (see Collins 2004a, pp. 731-744; 
Collins 2004b; Collins 2008; Collins and Evans 2007;Collins, Evans, Ribeiro, & Hall 
(2006); www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/expertise).1 Interactional expertise is the ability to talk the 
science even if one cannot do the science.2 
But if the idea of interactional expertise resolves the problem of how much 
scientific grasp one needs to be able to do the kind of work my colleagues and I do, it 
does not provide a rule for when part one of the double hermeneutic gives way to part 
two. I think that many of us have simply glossed over this problem for years. We have 
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not even noticed that it exists. Certainly, I can say as a participant in the field of science 
studies that I had never really noticed that it existed until this very chapter began to take 
shape. In more concrete terms the problem goes as follows: Suppose I am analyzing the 
way Joe Weber’s claims about the discovery of gravitational waves came to be rejected 
(see, for example, Collins, 1975, 2004a). I immerse myself in the discourse of 
gravitational wave physics and learn to understand all the arguments that were used by 
the actors in their debates with one another. Most of these arguments will be reproduced 
in my account of the ending of the controversy. But at a certain point I will say to the 
actors: “You don’t really understand how your world works. I understand it better.” This 
point becomes clear when the actors tell me things such as are contained in the following 
remark made by Richard Garwin, Weber’s most influential critic in the 1970s: 
I do not consider you “a trained observer of human behavior,” so far as concerns 
the gravity wave field. Science and technology move ahead through advances in 
instrumentation and publication of results. Not through gossip or “science wars” 
or deep introspection about what the other guy is thinking or what one is 
thinking oneself. (Personal communication, March 13, 2001) 
This is one of the most important actors in the world that I take it upon myself to 
describe and he is telling me that I do not understand that world  -- his world. My 
response, of course, is that it is he who does not understand his own world. Here, then, I 
have thoroughly abandoned the actors’ perspective. So far as I can see, I have never 
before even noticed that what I was doing was abandoning the actors’ perspective and 
substituting my own contradictory perspective. I have certainly never thought about how 
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such a move could be justified, and I do not know of any existing discussion of the 
matter. 
Nevertheless, I think it is clear that social analysts of science do the right thing 
when, at a certain point, they abandon the account of the world provided by the actors 
and substitute their own account. Without this move there would be very little substance 
to the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). What can one say in favor of the move in 
the absence of a fully worked-out justification? Firstly, as in any science, justification 
must come to an end and one simply has to do the analysis and look to the outcome as its 
own justification. This is not an excuse to stop thinking about the problem but it is a 
reason not to give up one’s apparently successful scientific practice as soon as one has 
found a philosophical or methodological difficulty. (Collins and Yearley (1992) suggest 
that paralysis, reminiscent of the fate of logical positivism, follows from too much self-
reflection on method.) 
Secondly, the move is consistent, not arbitrary: The move is always made at 
roughly the same point in the investigation with roughly the same consequences, so it 
does not have a post hoc self-serving look about it. Furthermore, the move grows out of 
epistemological considerations. It is meant to show how the world of science works; the 
move is not designed to reach any particular substantive conclusion in the case of any 
particular scientific controversy.3 The consistency of the move, irrespective of the 
contents of the science, holds out the hope that some good systematic way of accounting 
for the move in epistemological terms might one day be found. 
Thirdly, as time has gone by, many of the actors themselves have begun to 
recognize the value of this kind of sociological perspective on their world. They do not 
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have to become sociologists or buy into the entire sociological perspective, to see that 
valuable understandings do emerge from this sociological approach. One might describe 
the situation in terms of interactional expertise and contributory expertise.4 Social 
analysts superimpose their contributory expertise in the analysis of scientific 
controversies on their interactional expertise in the world of the actors. Sometimes this 
involves contradicting the actor’s understandings of their own world. Those of the actors 
who have acquired a degree of interactional expertise in the social analyst’s world have 
begun to see the point. They find that, at the very least, social analysts’ contributory 
expertise can enrich their understanding of their world, if not overturn it. The positive 
reaction of many of the actors, painfully won over the years, is reassuring. 
 
Using Symmetry Asymmetrically 
So far, it has been “discovered” that a necessary move from accepting actors’ 
categories to rejecting actors’ categories is always made in the standard analysis of 
scientific controversies under SSK and that this move has, as far as can be seen, never 
been analyzed, warranted, or even remarked upon in SSK (my apologies to those who 
have made remarks that I have overlooked).5 Now I raise my gaze from the way 
individual scientific controversies have been analyzed under SSK to broader patterns of 
analysis in our analytic community. What has the SSK analysis of scientific controversy 
been used for? 
It seems to me that the SSK analysis of scientific controversy has been most 
widely used to “deconstruct” scientific authority. Trevor Pinch and I used it this very way 
in the widely read first volume of The Golem series (Collins & Pinch, 1993/1998). There 
we wrote about “levelling the scientific terrain” (p.141) and analytically conquering the 
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forbidding peaks of scientific authority such as “Mount Newton” (p.141) and “Mount 
Einstein” (p. 141). All this was to be accomplished by showing that the logic of science 
was not so far removed from the logic of everyday life. In other words, we were 
weakening scientific authority by imposing the analysts’ world on that of the actors.6 Our 
typical move was to take a scientific episode that appeared to have been closed by the 
overwhelming weight of theory and experiment, open it up again, and show that, insofar 
as it was ever closed, it was closed by “nonscientific” means. The license imparted by 
this kind of analysis for contemporary policy issues is to show that controversies declared 
closed by “the scientific authorities” are still open. The viewpoint of those with 
dissenting voices is reexamined and shown not to have been defeated according to the 
standards of science. A protoexample from chapter 2 of The Golem series book is the 
falsification of the widely accepted notion, enshrined with authority in most physics 
textbooks, that the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 showed the speed of light to be 
a constant. This is incorrect.  In fact it took about 40 years for it to become widely 
established that the speed of light was a constant.  As late as the 1930s papers were being 
published and prizes awarded for work showing that it was not a constant. If Trevor and I 
had been around in, say, 1920 and had encountered scientists arguing that Einstein must 
be right because the speed of light had been shown experimentally to be a constant, we 
would have been able to reply: “No, it has not—there is still a controversy about that.” If 
some scientist had said to us: “That’s not a real controversy, just a few mavericks who 
refuse to accept Einstein in the face of all the evidence,” we would have said: “You don’t 
understand your own world.” There are also more recent cases in which this kind of logic 
has been put to use: 
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1a  Scientists working for the plant-breeding industry say that genetically modified crops 
are safe to plant, but the analyst says that, no, there is still a scientific controversy 
going on about that. 
1b  According to the British government, scientists say that Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) cannot be transmitted to humans, but the analyst says that, 
no, there is still a scientific controversy going on about that. 
1c  The British government says that scientists have shown the combined mumps, 
measles, and rubella (MMR) vaccine to be safe, but the analyst says that, no, there is 
still a controversy going on about whether the MMR vaccine causes autism in some 
children. 
So far so good, but a warning alarm is sounded by the existence of another set of 
arguments: 
2a  The U.S. government says that scientists cannot agree about whether global warming 
is a real threat. The analyst says that, yes, they can and that those people who say it is 
not a real threat are a small minority who should be ignored and that they are serving 
the interests of the government. 
2b  The tobacco industry says that scientists cannot agree about whether tobacco causes 
lung cancer. The analyst says that, yes, they can and that people who disagree are a 
small minority who should be ignored and that they are serving the interests of the 
industry. 
2c  The motor industry says that scientists are unable to agree over whether lead in the 
atmosphere caused by exhaust emission from cars lowers the IQ of children. The 
analyst says that, yes, they can and that people who say it does not are a small 
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minority serving the interests of the motor industry. 
The two types of argument are set out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Two Types of Argument Used by Social Analysts When Looking at Controversies 
 
Type 
Government/industry 
claim 
 
Social analyst’s claim 
Social analyst’s 
conclusion 
1 Consensus on problem Disagreement significant No consensus on problem
2 No consensus on problem Disagreement insignificant Consensus on problem 
 
 
Unlike the move toward disagreeing with the actors’ categories at a certain point, 
which is consistent with saying that each controversy studied was settled by nonscientific 
means, this argument sometimes goes one way and sometimes another. Only sometimes 
does the analyst overrule the actor’s categories and say the controversy was not closed 
“scientifically.” At other times the analyst says that, scientifically speaking, the 
controversy is closed. As with the other type of case, there is no explicit justification for 
the way the relationship between actor and analyst goes, but this time it is more worrying. 
If an argument sometimes goes one way and sometimes another, without an external 
justification, it can be self-serving. It could be that analysts decide in advance whose side 
they are on and then choose the direction of the argument according to the way they want 
it to come out. My impression as a participant in the broad field of science and 
technology studies (STS)7 over recent years is that there is some self-serving in the way 
the argumentative strategy is chosen.  If my impression is correct, STS is changing from 
a discipline concerned with the nature of knowledge to a social movement concerned 
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with defense of the powerless and support for green issues, with the epistemology being 
plugged in each time in whichever way gets the political job done best. 
My impression as a participant could be backed up by a survey of the content of 
recent presentations at conferences and of recently published papers. I suspect that such a 
survey would reveal that the large majority of such papers and presentations argued in 
favor of environmental issues and the like, the relationship between analyst and scientific 
actors sometimes going one way, sometimes another, depending on the analyst’s 
preferred political stance. It is a case where Max Weber’s entreaty to confirm adequacy at 
the level of meaning with causal adequacy in explanations would be useful. 
Unfortunately, I do not have the data to hand or the means to collect it, but we can do a 
little more analytical work before we finish. 
The analysis seems to show another consequence of a shift from a concern with 
scientific knowledge to a concern with policy.8 The additional consequence is that policy 
concerns and social-epistemological concerns have a different logic when it comes to the 
analysis of scientific controversies. To do scientific knowledge work, one always reopens 
scientific debate; to do policy work sometimes one reopens what people take to be 
closed, and sometimes one closes what people take to be open. That is a consequence that 
we should embrace. But how might we embrace it while avoiding the charge of being 
post hoc and self-serving? 
It is often useful to start with an extreme case and work back to less clear-cut and 
more difficult examples. Let us begin, then, with “green-ink letters.” Scientists (and here 
I can include myself), often receive letters from those who believe they have found a 
fundamental flaw in the theory of relativity or have developed some new all-inclusive 
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theory of the universe. After I publish something in the science news journals, or after 
one of my books is reviewed in the scientific press, I often receive three or four such 
items, recognizable by certain characteristics. They are often rich in mathematical 
symbolism and, in the old days, when they came by post, they were mostly characterized 
by peculiar formatting. They might be written in green ink, or closely typed on both sides 
of the paper with no margins, or written on lined paper with no introduction or 
conclusion. These communications are what I call “green-ink letters.” Among them there 
may be one or two that really are of world-shattering importance, but for practical 
purposes one has to assume that they are not. Again, in practice there is insufficient time 
(even if one had the competence) to track down the flaws in each case to the point where 
one could be certain that there was nothing in them. 
I believe that someone who felt it interesting could take any one of these 
communications and apply the tools of SSK to reveal that the kind of process scientists 
use to reject green-ink letters is not scientifically pure or decisive. It would then be 
possible to resurrect the logic of any one of the claims, showing it to be not completely 
unworthy of consideration. This effort would be a perfectly proper and revealing exercise 
in SSK (though perhaps only suitable as a training exercise nowadays since we know in 
advance that it could be done and that therefore the outcome would not count as a 
discovery but merely a display of competence). The point is, however legitimate and 
valuable an exercise it would be in SSK, it would not be a proper and valuable exercise in 
science policy. Today’s routine technical decisions cannot be made on the basis that 
relativity might be wrong and that all the money going into orthodox research based on 
relativity should be put on hold until the matter is resolved. This case is one where the 
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policy analyst has to say that, even though some people want to say that the argument 
about relativity is still open, it is “really” closed. It is a Type 2 case, not a Type 1 case.9 
Or consider the following imaginary example. I wake up one morning and decide 
that cancer is caused by drinking coffee. I point out the long-term correlation between the 
massive increase in coffee-drinking in my country and the increase in cancer as the 
recorded cause of death. Furthermore, there is a rough correlation at the level of whole 
societies between high consumption of coffee and expenditure on cancer therapies. I send 
out a press release, and the newspapers pick it up and run the story. Members of the 
public report a number of incidents in which someone was diagnosed with cancer a few 
months, or years, after they increased their consumption of coffee. After a short while, 
the existence of a connection between coffee-drinking and cancer becomes widely 
accepted. The relationship between coffee-drinking and cancer becomes part of the 
actors’ perspective. Many coffee growers are bankrupted, and their laborers, deprived of 
wages, become weak and ill. 
Does such a train of events constitute a scientific controversy? Once more, the 
sociologist of scientific knowledge could treat the matter symmetrically and use it to 
explore the ways in which one scientific idea gets promulgated and another does not. 
Such an investigation would show that there is no certain proof that coffee ingestion does 
not contribute to the onset of cancer. But, again, for policy purposes, this case cannot be 
treated as Type 1 but must be treated as Type 2. For policy purposes, there is no scientific 
controversy here.  For policy purposes we have to say that this kind of thing is not a 
scientific controversy or anyone would be able to start a scientific controversy whenever 
they wished.10 
 13
How might one argue that these two cases are Type 2 rather than Type 1 given 
that it is known from the analysis of scientific knowledge that every controversy can be 
re-opened? It is a hard problem. Perhaps one solution, admittedly not a very satisfactory 
one, is to look at origins. When it comes to policy, the charge “genetic fallacy” should no 
longer be treated as a decisively damning criticism. For policy purposes the origin of a 
controversy can play a part in the decision-making process. In the case of green-ink 
letters, it is precisely the origin that warns against taking their policy implications too 
seriously. In the case of coffee and cancer, it is again origins. “I wake up one morning 
and decide . . .” is the giveaway. 
The invocation of origins can be used only in extreme cases, however.11 The 
courts typically assess the credibility of expert witnesses by references to their origins, 
and, of course, as SSK has shown, scientists do this on a regular basis as a means of 
finding a resolution to the problem of “experimenter’s regress” (see Collins, 1992, for 
example). It is not analysis of origins of this relatively subtle kind that I am putting 
forward as a possible policy choice. That subtle kind of discussion of credibility belongs 
within a scientific controversy. The decisions being looked at in this context are about 
whether a scientific controversy even exists. It is being suggested that a certain scientific 
credibility is required in order to provide a license for starting a scientific controversy. A 
certain amount of scientific work by a reasonably credible scientist has to be done before 
the analyst should say “This is a scientific controversy.” Consequently, the analyst can 
sometimes say “This is not a scientific controversy” and press the case that not just 
anyone should be able to dream one up. 
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Of course, even a dreamed-up medical controversy, if it gets going, has to be dealt 
with. As every social scientist knows, to deal with such a thing one must start by 
understanding the actors’ perspective. In this case it might well be discovered that the 
actors do believe there is a genuine scientific problem and will treat denials by the 
authorities as a cover-up intended to save, say, the coffee industry (in this case). People 
whose first reaction is to take the side of the powerless will side with the actors and plug 
in the social epistemology in the style of a Type 1 controversy. Such a response implies 
that there is a scientific justification for the abandonment of coffee-drinking. It is one 
thing to understand the actors in order to subvert their actions and persuade them that 
they are partaking in a moral panic rather than a matter of serious concern; it is another 
thing to justify their actions on the grounds that the scientific controversy is “real.” 
Going back to the controversies summarized in Table 1, I find that it looks very 
much as though case 1c—the debate about the MMR vaccine—is rather like the imagined 
coffee-cancer controversy. The difference is that the person who “woke up one morning 
and decided that autism was caused by the MMR vaccine” was a medical doctor who had 
published results showing that the measles virus might be associated with autism. The 
doctor first announced the connection between autism and the combined MMR vaccine 
per se at a press conference. However, even he recommended that parents continue with 
the single-shot measles vaccine. There seems to be no scientific evidence, only anecdotal 
reports by parents, that the MMR vaccine per se was associated with autism. These 
observations are sociological, not scientific. One need know nothing of the biology of the 
gut, the nature of vaccines, the etiology of autism, or the methods of epidemiology to 
recognize that this case was not a “real” scientific controversy. An analysis of the origins 
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of the controversy is good enough. Case 1c, then, should really be case 2d. In the absence 
of a full survey, this case does seem to illustrate the dangers inherent in the situation 
represented by Table 1. It does appear that the position adopted by some social analysts 
was self-serving, and it does suggest that social studies of science might be becoming a 
social movement rather than a discipline concerned with epistemology. 
It is fitting that a contribution to a book emerging out of a workshop held in 
Heidelberg, the home of Max Weber, should be concerned with the tension surrounding 
the idea of understanding the actors’ perspective. For decades I have described myself as 
an interpretative sociologist, never quite noticing the violence I was doing to actors’ 
categories as an integral part of my analysis of how science “really works.” But I think I 
now see that Weber was right and that interpretation alone is not enough. I have 
discovered the aforementioned violence in my own work. I have at one point suggested a 
survey as a useful supplement to the verstehende (interpretive) method. In this case it 
would be useful if adequacy at the level of meaning were topped up with a bit of causal 
adequacy. But most important, I have argued that in the case of policy analysis of the 
sciences, as opposed to knowledge analysis, a still more brutal choice has to be made 
between groups of actors. This choice cannot be avoided if sociology is to be practiced as 
the kind of science for which Weber argued and if social analysts of science are to avoid 
slipping into the politically appealing rhetoric that he warned against. The appeal simply 
to take the actors’ perspective merely sidesteps this necessary choice.12 The next task is 
to find a better way to separate scientific controversies into their two types—a way that 
does not refer to the political desirability of the outcome. I have suggested that an 
examination of the origin of a controversy is one such means, but this is just a start. 
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1 My apologies for the overwhelming number of self-citations in this paper, but it is a matter of working out 
the consequences of a brand new program. 
2 I am grateful to Peter Meusburger for reminding me that this point reflects a similar debate in the case of 
the arts. In Collins and Evans (2007) we do discuss the relationship between the sciences and the arts. We 
claim that an important difference is that the consumer’s role in the legitimation of knowledge is bigger in 
the arts than in the sciences, so the nonperforming critic also has a more legitimate role from the outset. In 
science the right of the outsider to comment critically on the content of a science is much harder to 
establish. 
3 There are some observers who think the goal should be to strengthen the voice of the weaker party in a 
scientific dispute. But because it is not always clear who the weakest is, and because sometimes the weak 
will become strong as time passes, the prescription cannot be applied consistently even if it could be 
justified, and I have never seen a justification (see Ashmore, 1996; Collins, 1996; Scott, Richards, & 
Martin, 1990). 
4 Contributory expertise is the expertise needed to make a practical contribution to the subject under study. 
Interactional expertise is the expertise required to talk fluently about it. 
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5 The move is essentially the same thing as the kind of imperialism that many anthropologists try to avoid. 
As I understand it, evaluation of actors’ worlds is considered incompatible with analysis of the actors’ 
worlds (though the anthropologist can, of course, express an opinion in his or her time off as it were). Peter 
Meusburger points out that a similar debate has gone much further in the study of religion. 
6 Cleverly using our rhetorical nous to describe our project as merely “display[ing] science with as little 
reflection on scientific method as we can muster” (Collins & Pinch 1993/1998, p. 2) 
7 STS is a much broader study of science, technology, and its relation to society in which sociology of 
scientific knowledge is subsumed. 
8 Collins and Evans (2002) try to put this shift on a systematic footing. 
9 This, incidentally, is one of the problems for the position adopted by Brian Josephson as expressed at the 
Heidelberg conference that is the source of this volume. Josephson has discovered that the arguments 
deployed by his scientific colleagues to dismiss the likes of cold-fusion or homeopathy are not up to the 
standards of the canonical version of science. He correctly infers that there remains a small chance that 
there is something in them. What does not follow, however, is that the chance is large enough to make them 
worth pursuing. Josephson is right to fault the rhetoric in the dismissal of these maverick claims but wrong 
in drawing the conclusion that the associated controversies are not over for nearly all practical purposes. If 
it is true that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, it is equally true that absence of disproof is 
not disproof of absence. 
10 Of course, they would need power with the media, but in this context I am dealing with the logic of the 
analysis of science, that is to say, the logic of how sociologists exercise our power as analysts. Whether it is 
significant power is another matter. We must always write our books and papers on the assumption that 
they will have the same political impact as, say, Marx’s Capital. It is worth noting that so little is known 
about the detailed causal structure of the medical world that there is ample scope for dreaming up medical 
controversies, and it seems to happen quite frequently. 
11 Thanks to Martin Weinel for pointing out the possible confusion discussed in this paragraph. 
12 The abdication of responsibility is still more clear in cases like that of AIDS treatment in South Africa 
(see Weinel, 2008). 
